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participants,” and the reporting of data
regarding swaps to “swap data repositories,” and, most important, by authorizing the Commodity Future Trading
Commission and Securities Exchange
Commission, to designate swaps which
will be required to be cleared through
derivatives clearing organizations, and
executed on derivatives clearing markets
or swap execution facilities. The statute
also mandates regulation of and reporting by such clearing organizations, markets, and facilities. With regard to consumer protection, the statute enacted
few new substantive protections, except
for requirements concerning mortgages
adopted by Title XIV of Dodd-Frank, but
rather transferred virtually all consumer
protection responsibilities vested in other
agencies, most especially the Board and
Federal Trade Commission, to a newly
formed Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau. This agency is nominally under
the Board, but the Board’s authority
over it is strictly circumscribed, and its
budget is protected from congressional
interference.
But in both areas implementation
of the law has not gone smoothly. The
CFTC has identified 38 “areas” in which
it will take regulatory initiatives. As of
the end of 2012, the CFTC had issued
41 final regulations under Dodd-Frank,
but in some of the 38 areas, it had issued
more than one final rule, and in others
it has yet even to propose any rules. It
has encountered particular difficulty in
connection with the critical requirement
of clearing, which is afflicted with statutory exemptions the Commission has
interpreted broadly, adding additional
exemptions of its own. It has had special
difficulty, too, with the international application of Dodd-Frank provisions.
Perhaps nothing has been more
controversial or deeply divisive as the

CFPB. As is well known, its startup was
delayed when Senate Republicans made
clear they would filibuster the nomination of the woman whose brainchild
it is widely reputed to be, Elizabeth
Warren (who of course responded by
running for a Senate seat and winning),
and in turn that they would filibuster
the appointment of any Chair. President
Obama responded with the “recess” appointment of Richard Cordray, but in
January, the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia invalidated similar
appointment of NLRB members, in a
decision that departs from the rulings
of other courts of appeals and is almost certain to invite Supreme Court
review. That review is unlikely to be
completed before early summer 2014.
While the CFPB has been active since
Mr. Cordray’s recess appointment, the
invalidation of the appointment could
undo all that has been done, leaving the
law unsettled nearly four years after the
enactment of Dodd-Frank.
One commentator has likened the
regulatory activity under Dodd-Frank
to an amusement park game of bumper
cars, with toy vehicles constantly colliding and going nowhere. The comparison
is hardly exaggerated. n

Langbein is Professor of Law at the
University of Miami, teaching courses in
banking law, commercial law, and international taxation. He is working on a treatise
to be titled Federal Regulation of Bank
Enterprise.
___________________________

Guantánamo
Military
Commissions:
“Judicial Approval
and Guidance”
By Christina M. Frohock

T

he use of military commissions to try alleged terrorists in
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, has attracted
worldwide scrutiny and intense criticism. A military commission is a court
convened before a military judge rather
than an Article III judge, designed to
try individuals accused of offenses during war. The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit recently weighed in on
the legitimacy of Guantánamo military
commissions, and its opinion in Hamdan
v. United States offers both approval and
guidance.
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion follows an earlier opinion from the
Supreme Court concerning the same
Guantánamo detainee, Salim Ahmed
Hamdan. Hamdan is a Yemeni national
who belonged to al Qaeda, transporting
weapons and serving as driver and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden from 1996
to 2001. He was captured in Afghanistan
and detained as an enemy combatant
in Guantánamo. After more than two
years in detention, Hamdan learned his
charge: one count of conspiracy.
Facing trial by military commission,
Hamdan filed a habeas petition to challenge the legality of the proceedings. In
2006, the Supreme Court in Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld ruled in his favor. The Bush
Administration’s military commissions
system was sparse at best, as a detainee
could be excluded from his own trial
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and convicted based on undisclosed
evidence. The Supreme Court held that
this system lacked congressional authorization and failed to adhere to both the
Uniform Code of Military Justice and
the Geneva Conventions. Exigency lent
legitimacy to a military commission,
but did not “justify the wholesale jettisoning of procedural protections.” If
the executive wanted to try detainees
by military commission, it would have
to afford “at least the barest of . . . trial
protections.” A plurality of four justices
also decided that conspiracy was not an
offense against the law of war triable by
military commission.
Congress quickly responded by
enacting the Military Commissions Act
of 2006. The MCA restyled the military
commissions system by codifying procedural safeguards for defendants and
enumerating twenty-eight triable offenses. Among these, the MCA allowed
punishment by military commission
for anyone who “conspires to commit”
substantive offenses and for anyone
who provides “material support or resources” for terrorism.
With the MCA in hand and a more
robust trial structure in place, the government prosecuted Hamdan anew—
and added a charge of material support
for terrorism to the original charge of
conspiracy. This time around, Hamdan
was tried by military commission in
Guantánamo and received a mixed verdict. He was acquitted of conspiracy but
convicted of providing material support
for terrorism and sentenced to sixty-six
months in prison. In January 2009, he
was released to his home country of
Yemen. Even after release, he continued
to appeal his conviction.
In October 2012, Hamdan again
prevailed in the American court system.
The D.C. Circuit in Hamdan v. United
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States reversed and vacated his conviction. Congress had intended the MCA
to be merely “declarative of existing
law” allowing prosecution of crimes that
occurred before enactment. The court
found that the MCA did “codify some
new war crimes, including material support for terrorism,” and therefore could
not authorize retroactive prosecution
of these new crimes. Because the Act
passed in 2006, its proscription of material support for terrorism could not
apply to Hamdan’s alleged activities supporting bin Laden and al Qaeda between
1996 and 2001. Accordingly, he could be
convicted only if a prior law criminalized
material support.
The court examined the relevant law on the books at the time of
Hamdan’s alleged misconduct and
found it wanting. Specifically, 10 U.S.C.
§ 821 provides jurisdiction for offenses
that “by the law of war may be tried
by military commissions.” Interpreting
“law of war” offenses by reference to
international law, the court found that
certain forms of terrorism, including
targeting civilians, are long recognized
as international-law war crimes. Not
so for material support for terrorism.
Because there was no timely proscription of that offense, Hamdan’s conviction could not stand.
The vacatur of Hamdan’s conviction triggered an immediate and
impassioned reaction in the media.
Commentators portrayed the opinion
as “the biggest blow yet” to the military
commissions system in Guantánamo
and “a powerful blow to the legitimacy
of those trials.” This “blockbuster opinion” from a conservative circuit served
to rein in “executive branch officials
[who] stubbornly sought to manipulate
the rule of law.”
Guantánamo is a sensitive topic.

Contrary to its media depiction, the
D.C. Circuit’s Hamdan opinion poses
no existential threat to Guantánamo
military commissions. Quite the opposite: the opinion is good authority to
convene future military commissions.
While formal convening authority rests
with the Secretary of Defense, courts
offer the complementary authority of
judicial review.The Supreme Court recognized exigency as lending legitimacy
to military commissions. Now, the D.C.
Circuit has recognized the trial process
as lending further legitimacy. The court
upheld the military commissions structure and guided prosecutors to charge
defendants carefully for conduct before
or after enactment of the MCA. Upon
examination, the opinion is a typical
appellate disapproval of a trial result—
based not on the illegitimacy of the
proceedings but on the misapplication
of a new law.
Like any appellate court, the D.C.
Circuit in Hamdan reviewed a lowercourt criminal proceeding and found a
fatal flaw. Promptly upon directing that
“Hamdan’s conviction for material support for terrorism be vacated,” the court
wrote a significant clarification: its opinion does not “preclude any future military
commission charges against Hamdan—
either for conduct prohibited by the ‘law
of war’ under 10 U.S.C. § 821 or for any
conduct since 2006 that has violated the
Military Commissions Act.” The opinion rejected Hamdan’s conviction on a
reasoned basis, but not the process that
generated that conviction.
Thus, Hamdan invites trials by
military commission and provides an
appellate-sanctioned roadmap for the
proceedings. Should the executive seek
to try an individual by military commission for actions that were criminalized
before he undertook them, it may do

so—as in the ordinary course in Article
III courts. For conduct before 2006,
international-law war crimes have long
included terrorism, aiding and abetting
terrorism, and targeting civilians. For
conduct after 2006, the MCA specifies
a myriad of crimes including material
support for terrorism.
Hamdan clarifies the military commissions procedure, and that clarity
is legitimating. Yet, clarity should not
be mistaken for simplicity. Any MCA
charges of “new war crimes,” including
material support for terrorism, are vulnerable under the D.C. Circuit’s timeliness analysis. While Guantánamo holds
al Qaeda leaders directly involved in
terrorist plots against the United States,
many of the current 166 detainees are
“low-level foreign fighters” who lacked
a significant role in terrorist organizations. The task of swearing and proving
charges remains difficult, and the stakes
for both prosecutors and defendants
remain high.
The stakes are particularly high in
the military commission trial underway
in Guantánamo against the September
11th defendants, most notably Khalid
Shaikh Mohammad, the self-proclaimed
“mastermind” behind the attacks.
Mohammad and four co-defendants
are charged under the MCA (as revised
in 2009) with eight offenses, including conspiracy, murder in violation of
the law of war, attacking civilians, and
terrorism. The defendants do not face
charges of material support for terrorism. Hamdan nonetheless weakens the
charge of conspiracy, especially given
the Supreme Court’s earlier plurality
opinion that rejected conspiracy as a
war crime. Indeed, the government
chose not to oppose defendants’ motion
to dismiss conspiracy, on the basis that
dismissal would avoid “additional un-

certainty and appellate risk” and allow
the case “to proceed without unnecessary delay.”
Dropping conspiracy would reduce the number of charges against
the September 11th defendants, but
not end the case. Applying the strictest
reading of Hamdan and including only
offenses that were established international-law war crimes before Congress
passed the MCA, serious charges remain. Attacking civilians and terrorism
are clear offenses against the law of war,
and those charges suffice for trial by
military commission.
The logic of Hamdan also applies to
prior convictions obtained by military
commission in Guantánamo: to the extent convictions for pre-2006 conduct
were based on offenses recognized as
war crimes, those convictions should
stand. Seven detainees have been convicted through military commissions;
four were subsequently transferred to
other countries. In addition to Hamdan,
one other detainee was convicted solely
of providing material support for terrorism. Australian citizen David Hicks
pleaded guilty in 2007 to one count of
material support. He was sentenced to
seven years, which by plea agreement
was reduced to nine months’ confinement in Australia. As part of the agreement, Hicks waived all appeals. Given
this waiver, Hamdan undercuts Hicks’
conviction in theory if not in practice.
In the end, far from undermining the legitimacy of Guantánamo
military commissions, Hamdan fosters
a richer understanding of the proceedings. By offering an ordinary appellate
analysis in the extraordinary context
of Guantánamo, the D.C. Circuit has
placed a military commission judgment
squarely in line with district court judgments and issued a reminder that prin-

ciples of fairness apply in military and
civilian trials alike. n
This Article is co-published online by the
National Security & Armed Conflict Law Review
at Miami Law. An extended version of this Article
appears in the Summer 2013 issue of the NSAC
Law Review.

Frohock teaches Legal Communication
and other courses on writing and on
Guantánamo legal issues. She has published
articles on Guantánamo and professionalism
in legal practice. Before joining Miami Law, she
was an attorney in NewYork City and Miami.
___________________________

Something of
Race Remains:
Identity in Public
Education
By Osamudia James

S

ummer of 2013 brought an opinion
in one of the more controversial
cases of the Supreme Court’s 2012
term, Fisher v. University of Texas.
In the case, Abigail Fisher, a white female who was denied admission to the
University in Texas in 2008, challenged
the University’s use of race in its admissions process as unnecessary and, thus,
unconstitutional, because the Texas Top
Ten Percent (TTP) program produces a
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